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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LAWYERS AS FIDUCIARIES

SANDE BUHAI*

INTRODUCTION
Law students, lawyers, and even courts sometimes have a tendency to
approach problems of legal ethics as one might approach tax—to begin and
end with the rules of professional conduct, parse them with technical rigor, and
conclude that conduct is permitted if not prohibited. To some extent, this is a
result of the way law schools now teach legal ethics. The Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination tests primarily on the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules); legal ethics courses often teach
to the test. To some extent, it reflects the fact that the obligations of lawyers
are summarized in a restatement, the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, which is separate from, and sometimes inconsistent with,
the Restatement (Third) of Agency. This is unfortunate. Lawyers are, first and
foremost, fiduciaries.
Consider the following hypothetical. A client retains a lawyer to assist in
purchasing Blackacre, on which she plans to build a shopping center. In the
course of his representation, the lawyer discovers that Whiteacre, immediately
adjacent to Blackacre, is for sale. Because of what his client has told him of
her plans, the lawyer knows that once the shopping center is built Whiteacre
will rise significantly in value. He has not discussed Whiteacre with his client,
nor has she mentioned it to him. Comment [5] to Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules
states in part: “if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop
several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase
one of the parcels in competition with the client . . . .”1 The Comment does not
explicitly prohibit purchase of adjoining parcels. May the lawyer purchase
Whiteacre for himself without consulting his client? As will be discussed
below in Part II.A, a lawyer who views legal ethics as a set of technical rules
might well conclude that he may. Indeed, many of the legal ethics colleagues
with whom I have explored this hypothetical have reached that conclusion.

* Clinical Professor, Loyola Law School. The author would like to thank Loyola Law School for
its support of scholarship. In particular, she would like to express her appreciation to her research
assistants and most importantly to Professor Theodore Seto for his invaluable assistance.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 5 (2008).
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And yet if the subject of our hypothetical were the real estate agent
representing the very same client on the very same project, his fiduciary
responsibilities would clearly prohibit him from doing so.2 The same would be
true if our hypothetical lawyer served as officer or director of the client, or as a
partner in the partnership building the shopping center. Can it really be that
lawyers are subject to less stringent ethical standards than other business
people? If experts in legal ethics assert that they are, can we really blame the
world for thinking poorly of our profession?
This Article reflects my sense that the lawyer’s role as fiduciary has been
inappropriately deemphasized in the consideration of legal ethical questions.
Part I provides a brief history of the concept of agency and fiduciary duty, both
in general and as applied to lawyers. The two, it turns out, are inextricably
intertwined. The lawyer, with good reason, has been called the “quintessential
fiduciary,”3 and the attorney-client relationship the “archetype for the fiduciary
obligation.”4 To ignore a lawyer’s obligations under the black-letter law of
agency in analyzing problems in legal ethics would be to ignore history.
Part II then analyzes the hypothetical given above under three apparently
conflicting sets of rules: (1) the Model Rules, (2) the Restatement (Third) of
Agency, and (3) the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.
Although the matter is not free from doubt, it seems likely that the Model
Rules permit our hypothetical lawyer to buy Whiteacre without first consulting
his client and obtaining her consent—in other words, to buy Whiteacre behind
her back. The Restatement (Third) of Agency, by contrast, clearly prohibits
him from doing so and affords his client ample remedies should he breach.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, finally, offers a
muddled answer. If confidential information is involved in his decision to
purchase Whiteacre, he may not do so without consulting his client and
obtaining her consent. If no confidential information is involved, however, the
position of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is unclear.
He may possibly be required to inform her that Whiteacre is for sale and desist
if she objects; however, even if he is required but fails to do so, his client may
apparently not recover for such breach in the absence of quantifiable harm.
The case law is equally muddled.
Part III, finally, proposes a resolution. The Model Rules are designed
primarily to govern disciplinary proceedings. They should not be read to
authorize or insulate from liability actions not explicitly prohibited. In
particular, fiduciary duties may impose further limitations on a lawyer’s
actions. A lawyer’s fiduciary duties, in turn, can usefully be broken into two

2. See, e.g., infra Part II.B.
3. Lester Brickman, The Continuing Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection: Ethics
2000’s Revision of Model Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181, 1191.
4. Id. at 1182.
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categories: duties of competence and diligence and duties of loyalty. Limiting
remedies for breach of the duties of competence and diligence to standard
negligence remedies, as some have suggested, may be appropriate. Remedies
for breach of duties of loyalty, however, cannot properly be so limited. No less
than any other agent, a lawyer should be liable for breach of such duties. Part
III concludes that in the hypothetical with which this Article begins, the
lawyer’s duties of loyalty preclude him from purchasing Whiteacre without
first consulting his client and obtaining her consent. Colloquially stated, they
prohibit him from purchasing Whiteacre behind his client’s back.
I. ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF THE LAWYER AS AGENT AND FIDUCIARY
I will to . . . be true and faithful, and love all which he loves and shun all which
he shuns, according to the laws of God and the order of the world. Nor will I
ever with will or action, through word or deed, do anything which is
unpleasing to him, on condition that he will hold to me as I shall deserve it,
and that he will perform everything as it was in our agreement when I
5
submitted myself to him and chose his will.

An agency relationship arises any time one person, a “principal,” gives
another person, an “agent,” the power to act on the principal’s behalf according
to the principal’s wishes, and the agent consents to do so.6 Agency arises in
relationships between client and attorney, employer and employee, partnership
and general partner, and corporation and officer, among other contexts.7 Once
an agency relationship is formed, the agent “has a fiduciary duty to act loyally
for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency
relationship.”8 In particular, agents have a duty not to seek personal gain from
third parties through the use of their position, treat their principals as adverse
parties, act on behalf of adverse parties, or otherwise compete with the
principals.9 In addition, agents have a duty not to use their principals’ property
or confidential information for the agents’ own purposes.10
Western law began wrestling with the problem of agency, particularly in
the context of legal representation, long before there was any such thing as
“fiduciary duty.” Indeed, although the law of fiduciary duty did not reach its
current form until the nineteenth century,11 the concerns it reflects have been

5. Anglo-Saxon Oath of Commendation, reprinted in 4 TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS
ORIGINAL SOURCES OF EUROPEAN HISTORY: DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF
FEUDALISM 3 (Edward P. Cheyney ed., 1898).
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
7. See id. § 8.01 cmt. c; see also Brickman, supra note 3, at 1182.
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
9. Id. §§ 8.02–8.04.
10. Id. §§ 8.02–8.05.
11. See Mary Szto, Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical

FROM THE
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present, in one form or another, since the days of Socrates.12 The core of
fiduciary duty, after all, is loyalty.13
In ancient Greece, representative advocacy was not officially recognized;
parties were required to represent their own interests.14 Parties could,
however, consult “interpreters” to explain the law to them15 and retain
“speech-writers” to draft arguments for the parties themselves to make in
court.16 Even in Greek law, however, collective organizations such as citystates and associations were represented by agents.17 Despite these limited
representative functions, the Greek orator became the model for the Roman
orator—in turn the prototype for the modern lawyer.18
As the Roman state expanded, geography made representation a practical
necessity. The vast majority of citizens and subjects lived too far away to
appear in Rome in person.19 This was true even with respect to appearances in
provincial capitals—provinces often being very large.20 As a result, it became
common to appoint personal representatives in legal matters.21 Only limited
formalities were required in such appointments. At first, to appoint an agent
for litigation, called a “cognitor,” a party was required to use a set form of
words with the adversary present.22 Later, a more informal kind of agent,
called a “procurator,” could be appointed by any words amounting to legal
instructions on how to handle a case; the adversary’s presence, or even
knowledge, was not required as long as the agent acted in good faith and
represented that his principal would support his actions.23 In any event, there
was no licensed profession of attorneys or agents.24 There were restrictions on
who could act as agents in litigation, including prohibitions against
representation by people under seventeen, women, the blind, the deaf and

Context, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61, 100 (2004) (identifying agency principles from the
nineteenth century as the basis for the Restatement of Agency).
12. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 34 (1953)
(arguing that larger organizations, like city-states or associations, could not literally appear in
person and required agents to represent them).
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (“General Fiduciary Principle:
An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected
with the agency relationship.”).
14. See POUND, supra note 12, at 31.
15. Id. at 30.
16. Id. at 31–32.
17. See id. at 34.
18. Id. at 33.
19. See POUND, supra note 12, at 36–37.
20. See id. at 37.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See POUND, supra note 12, at 40.
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“persons of bad character.”25 Beyond that, essentially anyone could act as a
legal representative.26
The results were perceived as problematic. Roth tells us that Quintus
Hortensius Hortalus (114–150 B.C.) was “the most prominent lawyer in Rome,
rising to the head of the bar—and indeed to the consulship, the highest office
in Rome—by dint of his oratorical skills and a complete lack of morals.”27 His
contemporary Cicero (106–143 B.C.) “complained about lawyers who don’t
know their law.”28
It was another half millennium, however, before the Romans began to
regulate legal representation much as we do today. A licensed and accredited
legal profession finally began to emerge in the fifth century A.D. A statute of
468 prohibited advocacy by persons not admitted to practice.29 The study of
rhetoric was no longer deemed adequate preparation. Those seeking to
practice law were required to study law; as a result, law schools emerged in the
major cities.30 The law fixed fees and provided for professional discipline.31
Collectively, these developments represented the foundations of the legal
profession in the West;32 they also necessitated a law of legal agency.
In Roman law, unlike modern law, actions of the agent were not deemed
actions of the principal; they were rather deemed the agent’s own.33
Nevertheless, agent and principal were bound contractually so that any benefits
derived from the agent’s actions would accrue to the principal, and any losses
or expenses suffered by the agent would be covered by the principal so long as
the agent acted in good faith.34 As Roman law became more complex, so did
the ways in which agency concepts were employed. An early form of trust,
called the “fideicommissio,” permitted testators “to devise their legacies to a
beneficiary who was incapacitated to receive a testament.”35 In addition, an
early type of security interest, called the “fiducia,” allowed a debtor to transfer
ownership of a property to a creditor until the debt was repaid, during which
time the property could not be sold.36

25. Id. at 39.
26. See id. at 40.
27. ANDREW ROTH & JONATHAN ROTH, DEVIL’S ADVOCATES: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY
OF LAWYERS 8 (1989).
28. Id. at 11.
29. POUND, supra note 12, at 51.
30. See id. at 50.
31. Id. at 50–51.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 38.
34. POUND, supra note 12, at 38.
35. Szto, supra note 11, at 89.
36. Id. at 90.
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Between the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476 A.D. and the revival
of the study of Roman law in Italian universities in the twelfth century,37
development of what was to become the Anglo-American law of agency took a
feudal turn. Loyalty—exemplified by the Anglo-Saxon oath of commendation
quoted at the beginning of this section—was central to the feudal property
system. The Roman concept of impersonal good faith was transformed into a
Germanic notion of personal commitment.
During this period, major technical developments in the English law of
fiduciaries took place in the property law context. Most importantly, the
Anglo-American “trust,” in which trustee is bound to beneficiary by fiduciary
duty, evolved to permit circumvention of a variety of medieval property rules.
The doctrine of utilitas ecclesiae,38 for example, allowed early clerics to
control church assets even when property ownership was prohibited by law or
church rules.39 In the 800s, influenced by utilitas ecclesiae, the Latin term ad
opus started appearing in Anglo-Saxon records, referring to “a fiduciary
relationship in favor of a beneficiary with no legal enforcement.”40 The term
ad opus, after being transferred to Gallic in the Domesday Book and Laws of
William the Conqueror as al os and ues, later became simply “use.”41 The
Franciscans, founded in 1209, became the first to employ the use on a wide
scale.42 Franciscans were prohibited by their vows from owning property.
They solved this rather awkward problem by vesting title to their land in
others; the order merely held the ad opus or use.43 Clerics also employed the
use to circumvent Statutes of Mortmain, which prohibited religious
corporations from possessing or controlling land.44
Uses also became popular under Edward III (1327–1377) to effect
bequests of land.45 At the time, such bequests were not legally enforceable.
Instead, therefore, “[f]eoffors would convey land to feoffees, who then
conveyed land to third persons—cestui que use—named in the feoffors’
wills.”46 Such transactions made use of the terms “use,” “confidence,” and
“trust” interchangeably.47

37. POUND, supra note 12, at 63.
38. Translated as “for the advantage of the church.” Shael Herman, Utilitas Ecclesiae
Versus Radix Malorum: The Moral Paradox of Ecclesiastical Patrimony, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1231,
1235 n.17 (1999).
39. Id. at 1235.
40. Szto, supra note 11, at 93.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 94.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 93.
45. Szto, supra note 11, at 95.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Perhaps of greatest concern to the Crown was the role of uses in avoiding
the payment of incidents. In addition to services, feudal landholders, as
holders of legal title were subject to various incidental obligations (or “relief”)
to the lords of whom they held—wardship, aid, forfeiture, escheat, and the
like.48 This “relief” could be extremely valuable to the lord and expensive to
the landholder. Land held in use, however, was not subject to relief.49 Not
surprisingly, over time the employment of uses became increasingly common.
In 1535, the Statute of Uses converted equitable uses into legal estates, thereby
rendering them subject to relief.50 Many uses, however, escaped conversion.
Personal property held in use, for example, was unaffected.51 A distinction
was also drawn between general trusts, on the one hand, and special or active
trusts, on the other. The latter escaped the Statute as well.52 Uses that
survived the Statute became “trusts,” enforceable in the Court of Chancery.53
The first fiduciary rules applicable specifically to lawyers appeared in the
Statute of Westminster I, Chapter 29, enacted during the reign of Edward I in
1275,54 which criminalized “ambidexterity”—the act of taking retainers from
opposing sides in a case55—as well as “deceit or collusion” of the court or a
party at court.56 The London Ordinance of 1280 regulated admission to
practice law in the London courts, addressing in addition a variety of specific
kinds of lawyer misconduct.57 The ordinance also expanded the Statute of
Westminster’s prohibition against taking money from both sides in litigation to
include representations adverse to a former client.58
Most of the cases decided under these statutes appear to have involved
conflicts of interest between one client and another current or former client, the
“ambidexterity” noted above.59 A few cases from the fifteenth century,

48. Avisheh Avini, The Origins of Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1139,
1144 (1996).
49. Id. at 1144–45.
50. Id. at 1146.
51. Id. at 1147.
52. Id.
53. Avini, supra note 48, at 1147.
54. Brickman, supra note 3, at 1191 & n.43; see also Jonathan Rose, The Ambidextrous
Lawyer: Conflict of Interest and the Medieval and Early Modern Legal Profession, 7 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 137, 145 (2000).
55. Brickman, supra note 3, at 1191–92.
56. Rose, supra note 54, at 145–46 (“The courts interpreted the prohibition on ‘deceit and
collusion’ very broadly. It was applied to conflicts of interest as well as many other forms of
lawyer misconduct. This regulation, the first and probably most significant regulation of lawyer
conduct, was probably the primary and most important conflict of interest prohibition.” (internal
citations omitted)).
57. See id. at 146.
58. See id. at 146–47.
59. See id. at 151.
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however, appear to have involved a conflict between the lawyer’s own
interests and those of his client. Three such cases appear to have involved
allegations of the use of confidential information to acquire property adverse to
the client—allegations somewhat similar to the facts of the hypothetical with
which I began this Article. Although the outcome of these cases is not known,
one infers that some remedy must have been available if such allegations were
proven correct.60
In 1729, an act for the “Better Regulation of Attornies and Solicitors” was
passed.61 Together with the formation of the Society of Gentleman Practisers
in 1739, this Act affirmed that lawyers should hold themselves to the standards
of “gentlemen,”62 which meant “above all the acceptance of moral as well as
legal obligations; it meant fair dealing with friend and foe. . . .”63 In other
words, lawyers should aspire to the kind of chivalric standards that had
historically been applicable to positions of feudal trust; and most importantly,
to a duty of loyalty.64 Although the statute and cases did not yet use the term
“fiduciary,” that concept was implicit.65
By the mid-1800s, the term “fiduciary” had come into common use to
describe relationships of trust and confidence.66 Today, in justifying its
summary of a lawyer’s duties to a client, the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers begins with a simple statement, viewed as selfexplanatory: “A lawyer is a fiduciary . . . .”67 Everything else, the authors
imply, follows from those five words.
II. CONFLICTING VIEWS: THE MODEL RULES, THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY, AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
Recall that our hypothetical lawyer has been retained by a client who
wants to purchase Blackacre, on which she proposes to build a shopping
center. During the course of his representation, the lawyer learns that an
adjacent parcel, Whiteacre, is available for sale. The lawyer and his client
have never discussed Whiteacre. Nevertheless, the lawyer expects, based on
information made available to him by reason of his representation of his client,
that Whiteacre will increase in value once the shopping center is finished.
Clearly, the lawyer may purchase Whiteacre for his own account if he first
60. See id. at 174–75.
61. Philip Aylett, A Profession in the Marketplace: The Distribution of Attorneys in England
and Wales 1730–1800, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 1 (1987).
62. HARRY KIRK, PORTRAIT OF A PROFESSION: A HISTORY OF THE SOLICITOR’S
PROFESSION, 1100 TO THE PRESENT DAY, at 203 (Oyez Publishing 1976).
63. Id. at 204.
64. See Brickman, supra note 3, at 1187–88.
65. See id. at 1189.
66. See id. at 1188–91.
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2000).
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consults with his client, his client consents, and other requirements are met.68
The more interesting question is whether the lawyer may purchase Whiteacre
for his own account behind his client’s back—that is, without consultation or
consent. On this question, the Model Rules, the Restatement (Third) of
Agency, and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers seem to
disagree.
A.

The Model Rules

The Model Rules do not themselves impose any general fiduciary
obligation, although they do occasionally refer to a “duty of loyalty,”69
imposed, one assumes, by some other source of law. Comment [1] to Model
Rule 1.15, entitled “Safekeeping Property,” states: “A lawyer should hold
property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. . . .
Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or
acting in similar fiduciary capacities.”70 In other contexts, however, the Model
Rules are framed without explicit reference to fiduciary duty. Two are relevant
to our hypothetical.
1.

Rule 1.8(a): Acquisition of an Interest Adverse to Client

Rule 1.8(a) states that a “lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction
with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other
pecuniary interest adverse to a client” unless appropriate disclosure is made
and consent obtained.71 Note that under this rule, a lawyer is prevented from
using any information to acquire interests adverse to his client, not merely
confidential information. In other words, whether the lawyer in our
hypothetical learned about Whiteacre by reason of the representation is
irrelevant to the Rule 1.8(a) prohibition.
The harder question is whether purchasing Whiteacre would be “adverse”
to the client. Note that Rule 1.8(a) actually places two prohibitions on the
lawyer’s actions unless specified disclosure and consent procedures have been
followed: (1) “enter[ing] into a business transaction with a client;” and (2)
“knowingly acquir[ing] an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2008). More fully stated, Model Rule
1.7(b) permits the representation notwithstanding the conflict if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and
diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another
client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal;
and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Id.
69. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 5 (2008).
70. Id. R. 1.15 cmt. 1.
71. Id. R. 1.8(a).
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interest adverse to a client.”72 Since our hypothetical lawyer is not proposing
to enter into a transaction directly with his client, we are concerned with the
second, which only limits the acquisition of “adverse” interests.
Unfortunately, the authors of the Model Rules offer no commentary with
regard to the meaning or scope of this second prohibition. Can we use
Comments [1] through [4], which address the first prohibition, to shed light on
the second? Since direct lawyer-client business transactions are inherently
adverse, perhaps comments on the first prohibition may be read to provide
guidance, albeit indirect, with respect to the second.
Comment [1] offers two examples of direct lawyer-client transactions that
can be undertaken only with appropriate disclosure and consent. In the first, a
lawyer has been retained to draft his client’s will.73 He learns that the client
needs money for an unrelated expense.74 Instead of referring the client to a
bank, the lawyer offers to lend the client the needed money himself.75 In this
situation, Rule 1.8(a) is violated “even when the transaction is not closely
related to the subject matter of the representation” because the “lawyer’s skill
and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between
lawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching.” The lawyer is,
therefore, required to adhere to disclosure and consent procedures before
making any such loan. The second example given in Comment [1] involves a
lawyer who is “engaged in the sale of goods or services related to the practice
of law.”76 Here, the lawyer sells title insurance or investment services to
existing clients of his legal practice. Again, to minimize the possibility of
overreaching, the lawyer must follow all Rule 1.8(a) disclosure and consent
requirements before making any such sales. But if overreaching is the issue, as
Comment [1] might be read to suggest, our lawyer’s proposed hypothetical
purchase of Whiteacre should not be a problem. After all, the seller of
Whiteacre is unrelated to either lawyer or client and is presumably able to take
care of himself.
Comment [3], however, states:
The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent
the client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer’s financial interest
otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client
will be materially limited by the lawyer’s financial interest in the transaction.
Here the lawyer’s role requires that the lawyer must comply, not only with the
77
requirements of paragraph (a), but also with the requirements of Rule 1.7.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 1 (2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. R. 1.8 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
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In effect, Comment [3] suggests that a lawyer’s own interest, concurrent or to
be acquired, should be deemed adverse if it “poses a significant risk that the
lawyer’s representation of the client will be materially limited by [that
interest].”78
Rule 1.7 supports such a reading. Rule 1.7(a)(2) provides that unless
appropriate precautions are taken, “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict
of interest exists if: . . . there is a significant risk that the representation of one
or more clients will be materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the
lawyer.”79 In other words, Rule 1.7 and Rule 1.8(a) protect against the same
risk—Rule 1.7 by prohibiting the representation without disclosure and
consent where the lawyer already holds the potentially adverse interest and
Rule 1.8(a) by prohibiting acquisition of that interest without disclosure and
consent once the representation has commenced. If so, we might re-frame our
question as follows: if our hypothetical lawyer had owned Whiteacre from the
outset, could he have undertaken to represent the client with regard to
Blackacre without first telling her of his ownership of an adjoining parcel?
Unfortunately, the answer to this question is no clearer.
The comments to Rule 1.7 distinguish between “directly adverse” and
other possible conflicts. Comment [6], with regard to directly adverse
conflicts, states: “The client as to whom the representation is directly adverse
is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer
relationship is likely to impair the lawyer’s ability to represent the client
effectively.”80 Feeling betrayed is a likely reaction to a breach of the duty of
loyalty, although the Model Rules do not use betrayal to define the scope of
that duty. I will return to whether betrayal of a client’s reasonable expectations
ought to play a larger role in defining the scope of a lawyer’s duty of loyalty in
Part III. Our hypothetical, however, does not appear to involve directly
adverse interests.
Even if “direct adverseness” does not exist, however, Comment [8] states
that “a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for
the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other
responsibilities or interests.”81 One can imagine circumstances, for example,
in which our hypothetical lawyer’s dispassionate consideration of his client’s
interests would lead him to advise his client to abandon the project—advice
that might now compromise his own financial well-being as owner of
Whiteacre.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2008) (emphasis added).
Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 6.
Id. cmt. 8.
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The question posed by the Model Rules, however, is not whether
ownership of Whiteacre would create any risk; the question is rather whether it
would create a “significant risk.” Comment [8] elaborates:
The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and
consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests
will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the
lawyer’s independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or
foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the
82
client.

One can easily imagine our hypothetical lawyer concluding that the risk of a
difference in interests is not “significant” and that he can therefore purchase
Whiteacre without complying with Rule 1.8(a)’s disclosure and consent
requirements.
2.

Rule 1.8(b): Use of Confidential Information

As I have noted, Rule 1.8(a) is not limited to the use of confidential
information. Our hypothetical, however, does involve such information; our
hypothetical lawyer believes that Whiteacre is currently undervalued precisely
because he is privy to his client’s plans. Does this make a difference? Rule
1.8(b) imposes an additional prohibition when confidential information is
involved: “A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a
client to the disadvantage of the client” without the client’s consent.83
Comment [5], cited at the beginning of this Article, elaborates:
Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
client violates the lawyer’s duty of loyalty. . . . For example, if a lawyer learns
that the client intends to purchase and develop several parcels of land, the
lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in
competition with the client . . . . The Rule does not prohibit uses that do not
84
disadvantage the client.

Our hypothetical lawyer clearly could not purchase Blackacre and then resell it
to his client at a profit. Using a client’s confidential information for personal
advantage without informing the client appears to be permitted under Rule
1.8(b), however, so long as there is no actual disadvantage to the client. Our
hypothetical lawyer might conclude that any disadvantage to his client by
reason of his purchase of Whiteacre would be speculative, since his client has
never mentioned interest in any property except Blackacre. Again, although
not completely clear, the Model Rules appear not to prohibit the purchase.

82. Id.
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b) (2008).
84. Id. cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
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The Restatement (Third) of Agency

Let us change the profession of the agent whose duties we are exploring.
The same client has also retained a real estate agent solely in connection with
the same shopping center project. Like the lawyer, in the course of his work,
the agent learns that an adjacent parcel, Whiteacre, is available for sale. The
question, of course, is whether he may purchase Whiteacre for his own account
behind his client’s back—that is, without consultation or consent. Under the
Restatement (Third) of Agency, the answer is clearly no, regardless of whether
confidential information is involved.
1.

Section 8.02: Material Benefit Arising Out of Position

Under Section 8.02 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency, “An agent has a
duty not to acquire a material benefit from a third party in connection with
transactions conducted or other actions taken on behalf of the principal or
otherwise through the agent’s use of the agent’s position.”85 Although the
section might not, on its face, appear to apply to our hypothetical, Comment
(d) confirms that it applies to business opportunities generally:
[A]ll agents, even those whose assigned work does not involve the assessment
or pursuit of business opportunities, have a fiduciary duty to the principal not
to take personal advantage of an opportunity . . . when either the nature of the
opportunity or the circumstances under which the agent learned of it require
that the agent offer the opportunity to the principal. In making this
determination, courts appropriately apply the test applicable to determining
whether a director or a senior officer of a corporation may take personal
86
advantage of a corporate opportunity.

In other words, all agents, not just corporate officers and directors, are subject
to the corporate opportunity doctrine. Cross-reference is then made to the
ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
(Principles of Corporate Governance) Section 5.05(b) for definition of the term
“corporate opportunity.”87
Before examining that section, however, it may be useful to place the issue
in historical context. Courts have struggled mightily to define the scope of the
corporate opportunity doctrine.88 In Miller v. Miller,89 decided in 1974, the
Minnesota Supreme Court summarized existing law as follows:

85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (2006).
86. Id. cmt. d.
87. Id. For the definition of corporate opportunity, see A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.05(b) (1994).
88. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davies, Jr., Corporate Opportunity and Comparative Advantage,
84 IOWA L. REV. 211, 211 (1999) (“The law’s efforts to define what constitutes a ‘corporate
opportunity’—those business opportunities that the corporation’s officers and directors must turn
over to the corporation rather than taking on their own behalves—have led to a multitude of
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We have searched the case law and commentary in vain for an all-inclusive or
“critical” test or standard by which a wrongful appropriation can be
determined and are persuaded that the doctrine is not capable of precise
definition. Rather, it appears that courts have opened or closed the business
opportunity door to corporate managers upon the facts and circumstances of
each case and by application of one or more of three variant but often
overlapping tests or standards: (1) The “interest or expectancy” test, which
precludes acquisition by corporate officers of the property of a business
opportunity in which the corporation has a “beachhead” in the sense of a legal
or equitable interest or expectancy growing out of a preexisting right or
relationship; (2) the “line of business” test, which characterizes an opportunity
as corporate whenever a managing officer becomes involved in an activity
intimately or closely associated with the existing or prospective activities of
the corporation; and (3) the “fairness” test, which determines the existence of a
corporate opportunity by applying ethical standards of what is fair and
90
equitable under the circumstances.

The Miller court then formulated a fourth test, which in turn has been
summarized by Professor Maynard as follows:
The first step in the Miller approach essentially involves a restatement of the
traditional line of business test, while the second step focuses on “the equitable
considerations existing prior to, at the time of, and following the officer’s
acquisition” of this corporate opportunity. Reduced to its essence, Miller’s
second prong, the “fairness” inquiry, requires the court to take into account
“ethical standards of what is fair and equitable under the circumstances” in
deciding whether a director has breached his fiduciary duty by usurping a
91
corporate opportunity.

As Professor Maynard notes, the ALI’s approach, articulated in its 1992
Principles of Corporate Governance, tracks the line of business test in its

formulations.”); Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO—Breach of Fiduciary Duty or
Spinning as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023, 2067 (2002) (“[T]he courts have struggled
to craft a workable definition of what constitutes a ‘corporate opportunity.’”); Eric G. Orlinsky,
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Interested Director Transactions: A Framework for
Analysis in an Attempt to Restore Predictability, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451, 454 (1999); Matthew
R. Salzwedel, A Contractual Theory of Corporate Opportunity and a Proposed Statute, 23 PACE
L. REV. 83, 84 (2002) (“[I]t is not clear in many jurisdictions what constitutes a corporate
opportunity. It is even less clear what constitutes an illegal usurpation, or taking, of a corporate
opportunity, which violates a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty.”); Eric Talley, Turning Servile
Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE
L.J. 277, 279 (1998) (“[T]he end product of this collective effort appears—by virtually all
accounts—more tautologous than diagnostic, replete with exceptions and indecipherable
distinctions that provide little guidance either to theorists or to practitioners.”).
89. 222 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1974).
90. See id. at 79–80 (citations omitted).
91. See Maynard, supra note 88, at 2069 (citation omitted).
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definition of corporate opportunity.92 It is also “similar to the two-pronged
analysis of corporate opportunity established in the Miller decision.”93 She
concludes:
Thus, the ALI approach allows the insider to take advantage of a
corporate opportunity but only if the fiduciary has “fully disclose[d] to the
corporation, all material facts concerning the opportunity.” Because this
disclosure-oriented approach provides a clear procedure for the insider to
protect herself against liability, several courts have embraced the ALI
formulation of the corporate opportunity doctrine.
The same fundamental concerns at the heart of the ALI approach are
likewise reflected in the most recent Delaware Supreme Court decisions
94
addressing the scope of the corporate opportunity doctrine.

Section 5.05(b) of the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance provides
in relevant part as follows (I have substituted “agent” and “principal” where
appropriate):
[A] corporate opportunity means:
(1) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which the [agent]
becomes aware, either:
(A) In connection with the performance of functions as [agent]; or
(B) Through the use of [the principal’s] information or property, if the
resulting opportunity is one that the [agent] should reasonably be
expected to believe would be of interest to the [principal]; or
(2) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which [the agent]
becomes aware and knows is closely related to a business in which the
95
[principal] is engaged or expects to engage.

As the reader has probably already concluded, under the corporate
opportunity doctrine in any of its incarnations, our hypothetical real estate
agent must clearly disclose the availability of Whiteacre to his client before
purchasing it himself. Whiteacre is immediately adjacent to Blackacre; its
availability thus meets the “interest or expectancy” test. It is relevant to the
client’s “line of business” under the “line of business,” Miller, and ALI
approaches. The opportunity to purchase Whiteacre is also one the agent
should reasonably believe would be of interest to the client. The “fairness”
test, appealing directly to the agent’s duty of loyalty, would lead to the same

92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 2069–70.
Id. at 2070.
Id. at 2071–72 (citations omitted).
A.L.I., supra note 87, § 5.05(b).
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result. It seems clear, therefore, that our hypothetical agent may not purchase
Whiteacre behind his client’s back.96
The Restatement (Third) of Agency articulates at least two reasons for this
conclusion. The first is:
the ordinary expectation that a person who acts as an agent does so to further
the interest of the principal and that it is the principal who should benefit from
turns of good fortune that may occur in connection with the transactions that
97
the agent undertakes on the principal’s behalf.

The second is precautionary:
Although the agent may believe that no harm will befall the principal, the
agent is not in a position disinterestedly to assess whether harm may occur or
whether the principal’s interests would be better served if the agent did not
pursue or acquire the benefit from the third party. Only the principal can
assess the potential impact on the principal’s interests of an agent’s anticipated
98
receipt of a material benefit to be furnished by a third party.

Both reasons apply to our hypothetical. Benefits from the fortuitous
availability of Whiteacre should accrue to the benefit of the principal, not the
agent. In addition, the principal, not the agent, is in a better position to
determine whether she would be adversely affected if the agent were to
purchase Whiteacre for his own account.
2.

Section 8.11: Duty to Disclose

Even if the corporate opportunity doctrine were not itself clear enough,
Section 8.11 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency further provides: “An agent
has a duty to use reasonable effort to provide the principal with facts that the
agent knows . . . when . . . the agent knows or has reason to know that the
principal would wish to have the facts or the facts are material to the agent’s
duties to the principal.”99 Comment (b) elaborates:
An agent’s duty to provide information to the principal facilitates the
principal’s exercise of control over the agent. . . . Information that the agent
provides to the principal may enable the principal to reconsider a course of
action that the principal has previously decided upon . . . . An agent’s duty to
provide information extends to information about the agent when it is material
to decisions the principal may wish to make. In some circumstances, the

96. See Davies, supra note 88, at 211 (“[T]he most common of those formulations share a
similar orientation. They focus on the likelihood that the corporation, in light of its present
business activities, would have found the opportunity worthwhile to pursue had the officer or
director not intervened to divert it to herself.”).
97. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. b (2006).
98. See id.
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (2006).
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principal may determine that it is wise to make alternative arrangements or to
100
take action to protect the principal’s interests.

Here, the client would almost certainly want to know about Whiteacre. Her
agent is, therefore, required to tell her about the availability of Whiteacre. His
disclosure will give her more precise control over his activities; it may lead her
to change prior decisions or instructions; and, if she comes to believe that his
loyalty is in question, it may permit her to take steps to protect herself.
3.

Comments to Section 8.01: Remedies

The Restatement (Third) of Agency recognizes accounting, disgorgement,
and constructive trust as standard remedies for breach of fiduciary duty,
regardless of whether the principal can establish either that she has been
harmed or the extent to which she has been harmed.101 Comment (d)(1) to
Section 8.01 states:
The law of restitution and unjust enrichment also creates a basis for an agent’s
liability to a principal when the agent breaches a fiduciary duty, even though
the principal cannot establish that the agent’s breach caused loss to the
principal. If through the breach the agent has realized a material benefit, the
agent has a duty to account to the principal for the benefit, its value, or its
102
proceeds.

Where the breach does not produce any profit to the agent, the agent may
forfeit all or part of his commission or other compensation. Comment (d)(2) to
Section 8.01 continues:
An agent’s breach of fiduciary duty is a basis on which the agent may be
required to forfeit commissions and other compensation paid or payable to the
agent during the period of the agent’s disloyalty. . . .
Forfeiture may be the only available remedy when it is difficult to prove
that harm to a principal resulted from the agent’s breach or when the agent
realizes no profit through the breach. In many cases, forfeiture enables a
remedy to be determined at a much lower cost to litigants. Forfeiture may also
have a valuable deterrent effect because its availability signals agents that
103
some adverse consequence will follow a breach of fiduciary duty.

Alternatively, the client can claim the property for herself on a constructive
trust theory, generally after reimbursing the agent for his costs. Comment (e)
to Section 8.02 provides:

100. Id. cmt. b.
101. Disgorgement of or accounting for profits is the standard remedy for appropriation of a
corporate opportunity. See, e.g., Orlinsky, supra note 88, at 524–25.
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d.1 (2006) (emphasis added).
103. Id. cmt d.2.
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[I]f an agent breaches the agent’s fiduciary duty by taking personal advantage
of a business opportunity . . . the principal may recover property that the agent
acquired through the breach only if the principal reimburses the agent. The
amount of reimbursement is either the amount paid by the agent for the
property or the amount for which the principal could have obtained the
104
property, whichever is less.

The availability of the foregoing equitable remedies, of course, does not
preclude liability for standard compensatory damages. Comment (b) to
Section 8.02 makes this clear: “[W]hen the principal can establish that the
agent’s conduct resulted in harm to the principal, the principal may recover
compensatory damages from the agent.”105
In sum, under the Restatement (Third) of Agency, our hypothetical agent
must tell his client about Whiteacre and may not purchase Whiteacre himself
without his client’s consent—or at least may not purchase it without first
offering it to his client. If he breaches this duty, his client can ask that he be
forced to disgorge any profits from his purchase. If he has no profits, she can
ask that he forfeit all or part of his compensation. Alternatively, she can
purchase the property from him at his cost. In any event, if she can
demonstrate harm, she can sue for compensatory damages.
4.

Applicability of the Law of Agency

But if the law of agency prohibits the client’s real estate agent from buying
Whiteacre behind the client’s back, should it not also prohibit the client’s
lawyer from doing so? I turn to this question specifically in Part III. A review
of the law’s application to sister professions, however, may provide useful
context.
a.

Real Estate Agents

Real estate agents are clearly bound by the foregoing rules. A real estate
agent’s relationship to the buyer or seller he represents is one of agent to
principal.106 Thus, “the law imposes on a real estate agent the same obligation
of undivided service and loyalty that it imposes on a trustee in favor of his
beneficiary.”107 In articulating the scope of this duty, the courts use the
standard lofty language of fiduciary obligation. A real estate agent owes a
duty that is “comprised of utmost good faith, integrity, honesty, and loyalty as
well as a duty of care and diligence.”108 Based on this position of trust, the

104. Id. cmt. e.
105. Id. cmt. b.
106. See 12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers § 109 (1997).
107. Batson v. Strehlow, 441 P.2d 101, 109 (Cal. 1968) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also 12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers § 173 (1997).
108. Perkins v. Thorpe, 676 P.2d 52, 55 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); see also 12 AM. JUR. 2D
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agent is under a duty “to disclose to [his] principal all material information [he]
possesses or obtains concerning the transaction involved.”109 Therefore, the
agent must disclose “‘all facts within his knowledge which bear materially
upon his principal’s interests.’”110 As a fiduciary, the agent must: “(1) account
for all funds or property rightfully belonging to the principal; (2) refrain from
acting adversely to the principal’s interests; (3) avoid engaging in fraudulent
conduct; and (4) communicate information he or she may possess or acquire
which is or may be to the principal’s advantage.”111
These duties, it should be noted, are imposed regardless of the scope of the
real estate agent’s engagement. A general agent is “an agent authorized to
conduct a series of transactions involving a continuity of service.”112 This type
of relationship often arises when the agent is a full-time employee of the
business—analogous to an in-house counsel. In the buying and selling of
individual homes, the agent is classified as a special agent, “an agent
authorized to conduct a single transaction or series of transactions not
involving continuity of service”113—analogous to a lawyer retained to handle a
particular case. Either way, the same rules apply.
b.

Corporate Officers and Directors

As the Restatement (Third) of Agency’s cross-reference to Principles of
Corporate Governance makes clear, corporate officers and directors are subject
to the same duties as well.114 Corporate officers and directors owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation and its stockholders;115 those duties are commonly
expressed in the standard language of fiduciary law. As the Delaware Supreme
Court stated in the landmark corporate opportunity case of Guth v. Loft, Inc.116:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust
and confidence to further their private interests. While technically not trustees,
they stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A
public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound
knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that
demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the
most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the

Brokers § 110 (1997).
109. Dubbs v. Stribling & Assoc., 712 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), order aff’d,
752 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 2001).
110. Goldberg Realty Group v. Weinstein, 669 A.2d 187, 190 (Me. 1996) (citing Jensen v.
Snow, 163 A. 784 (1933)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958).
111. 12 AM. JUR. 2D Brokers § 109 (1997).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3(1) (1958).
113. Id. § 3(2).
114. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
115. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
116. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
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interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from
doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of
profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to
enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule
that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands
117
that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.

If the lawyer in the hypothetical with which I began this Article were also an
officer or director of his client, he would clearly be precluded from purchasing
Whiteacre behind his client’s back.
c.

Partners

The answer for partners and joint venturers is more complex, but for
reasons that actually reinforce a conclusion that lawyers should be subject to
the broad duties outlined in the Restatement (Third) of Agency. Until recently
courts had universally recognized a fiduciary duty between partners and joint
venturers that imposed an obligation of the utmost good faith and integrity in
their dealings.118 As Justice Cardozo, then of the New York Court of Appeals,
stated famously in Meinhard v. Salmon119:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. . . . Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is . . . the standard of behavior. . . .
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty . . . . It will not
120
consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.

A fiduciary was to be “in a position in which thought of self was to be
renounced, however hard the abnegation.”121 Meinhard has since been cited in
over one thousand reported opinions.122
Although the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914123 did not contain “a
definitive statement”124 of a partner’s fiduciary duties, Section 9(1) provided

117. Id. at 510.
118. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 280 (2003); see also Robert W. Hillman, Closely Held
Firms and the Common Law of Fiduciary Duty: What Explains the Enduring Qualities of a
Punctilio?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 441, 443–48 (2006) (discussing the continuing role of good faith
and integrity in the courts, but also noting the contractarian views in the legal commentary).
119. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
120. Id. at 546.
121. Id. at 548.
122. Hillman, supra note 118, at 445.
123. See generally UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914).
124. J. William Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 109, 113 (1997).
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that “every partner is an agent of the partnership.”125 From this, courts
concluded that the Act invoked the fiduciary rules of agency law.126 In
addition, Section 21 provided that “every partner must account to the
partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him
without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with
the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by
him of its property.”127
Under the UPA, courts have generally held that partners have duties of
loyalty, care, fairness, and honesty to the partnership and their co-partners.
These duties can be separated into the following categories:
(a) a duty of loyalty, including a duty not to usurp partnership business
opportunities, a duty not to compete with the partnership, and a duty not to act
adversely to the partnership; (b) a duty of good faith and fair dealing; (c) a
duty to to exercise appropriate care in partnership management; and (d) a duty
128
to fully disclose matters that are material to the partnership and its business.

Thus, based on the UPA, the South Dakota Supreme Court declared in
1989 that the fiduciary duty between partners is one “of the highest order” and
that a partner “must walk a moral path above that tread by other members of
the economic marketplace.”129 The court held that a partner owes his partners
the same common law fiduciary duties that an agent owes his principal.130
In a UPA jurisdiction, if his partnership were purchasing Blackacre to
build a shopping center, our hypothetical lawyer would likely be precluded
from purchasing Whiteacre behind his partnership’s back.
As a contractarian view of partnership began to challenge the Meinhardian
perspective, in 1992 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated a markedly different approach to partnership fiduciary
duty,131 the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA).132 Professor Hynes
summarized the contractarian view in the following terms:

125. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 9(1) (1914).
126. Mark J. Loewenstein, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated Business Entities: In
Defense of the ‘Manifestly Unreasonable’ Standard, 41 TULSA L. REV. 411, 417 (2006).
127. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21(1) (1914).
128. Callison, supra note 124, at 114.
129. Glanzer v. St. Joseph Indian Sch., 438 N.W.2d 204, 211 (S.D. 1989).
130. See id. at 212 & n.6 (noting that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the
fiduciary duty owed by a general partner to a partner and providing the breach of fiduciary duty
instructions that were read to the jury).
131. See Michael Haynes, Partners Owe to One Another a Duty of the Finest Loyalty . . . Or
Do They? An Analysis of the Extent to Which Partners May Limit Their Duty of Loyalty to One
Another, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 433, 434, 447 (2005) (discussing background information on the
content and passage of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act).
132. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 101–1211 (1997).
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The essence of the partnership relationship is freedom of association. . . . The
relationship is a business relationship, entered into for profit. Absent gross
overreaching, duress, or fraud, the parties ought to be able to define the limits
of their relationship in the terms they wish. They alone must cope with the
sometimes difficult personal situations that can develop in complex, long-term
relationships. The parties, therefore, should be the ones who control the
boundaries of their relationship, not a court standing outside the situation and
133
second guessing actions that affect only the members of that relationship.

In other words, “[b]ecause partnerships are often formed between sophisticated
parties in an arm’s-length transaction, the parties should be free to
contractually define the nature of their association in any manner they deem
appropriate.”134
Section 404 of RUPA mounted a frontal challenge to Meinhard.
Subsection (a) began by rejecting any reference to the general law of agency:
“The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other
partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b)
and (c).”135 Subsection (b) then defined a partner’s duty of loyalty narrowly:
A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is limited
to the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of
the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of partnership
property, including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding
up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest
adverse to the partnership; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the
136
partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership.

Subsection (c) even more substantially limited a partner’s duty of care,
imposing a “gross negligence” standard: “A partner’s duty of care to the
partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding up of the
partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent
or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.”137
Subsection (d) acknowledged that: “A partner shall discharge the duties to the
partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership

133. J. Dennis Hynes, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Some Comments on the Latest
Draft of RUPA, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 727, 751–52 (1992).
134. Haynes, supra note 131, at 450.
135. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(a) (1997).
136. Id. § 404(b).
137. Id. § 404(c).
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agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing;”138 this obligation, however, was viewed as contractual,
not fiduciary.139 And Subsection (e) asserted ambiguously but provocatively
that: “A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under
the partnership agreement merely because the partner’s conduct furthers the
partner’s own interest.”140
Even under RUPA, in the absence of contractual provisions limiting his
duty of loyalty, our hypothetical lawyer would probably still be precluded from
purchasing Whiteacre behind his partnership’s back if the partnership were
then engaged in purchasing and developing the adjoining Blackacre. Section
404(b)’s duty of loyalty, although narrower than that imposed under UPA,
continues to prohibit “appropriation of a partnership opportunity.”141
But perhaps our lawyer could contract out of this duty in advance. The
UPA did not expressly address the extent to which a partner could limit his
fiduciary duties by contract. The tone of Meinhard, however, “suggests that
waivers [of fiduciary duty] would not be sympathetically reviewed by courts
operating under UPA and, indeed, that has been the case.”142
In BT-I v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,143 for example, a general
partner purchased and foreclosed a deed of trust on the partnership’s office
building, “squeezing out” the limited partner.144 Interpreting the UPA, the
California Court of Appeals reasoned that “every partner is bound to act in the
highest good faith to his copartner” and may not acquire any advantage over
his partner in any aspect of the partnership or any transaction.145 It therefore
concluded that the fiduciary duty of loyalty could not be contracted away in the
partnership agreement:146 “[t]he fiduciary obligations of a general partner with
respect to matters fundamentally related to the partnership business cannot be
waived or contracted away in the partnership agreement.”147
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota came to a similar conclusion in
Appletree Square I Ltd. Partnership v. Investmark, Inc.148 The court there held
that where one partner purchased an office building from other partners and
asbestos was later discovered, the selling partners were liable for breach of

138. Id. § 404(d).
139. Callison, supra note 124, at 116.
140. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(e) (1997).
141. Id. § 404(b).
142. Loewenstein, supra note 126, at 418.
143. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
144. Id. at 813.
145. Id. at 815 (quoting Leff v. Gunter, 33 Cal. 3d 508, 514 (1983)).
146. Id.
147. Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(citing BT-I, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816).
148. 494 N.W.2d 889 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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fiduciary duty for failure to disclose affirmatively, notwithstanding the fact that
the contract provided that information would be granted upon request and that
no such information had been requested.149 Partners are not free to destroy the
“fiduciary character” of a contract, the court reasoned.150 The court further
opined that “where the major purpose of a contract clause is to shield
wrongdoers from liability, the clause will be set aside as against public
policy.”151
RUPA, again, affects a contractarian revolution. Section 103(b)(3) voids
any attempt to eliminate the duty of loyalty completely, but provides further
that:
(i) [T]he partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories
of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly
unreasonable; or
(ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the
partnership agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all
material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the
152
duty of loyalty . . . .

Under this section, a contract provision purporting to allow partners to
purchase for their own account, without consultation or consent, any land not
previously identified for purchase by the partnership would be upheld “if not
manifestly unreasonable.”153
Since its promulgation, over 30 states have adopted RUPA in some
form.154 Its fiduciary duty changes, however, are “RUPA’s most controversial
provisions and are the ones most likely to be modified by adopting states.”155
Some states have moved further in the direction of freedom of contract:
Delaware and Virginia simply delete the duty of loyalty from the listing of
sections as to which the partners’ ability to override the statute is limited.
Alabama, Arizona, and Montana delete the “manifestly unreasonable”
qualifier. Maryland takes a slightly different approach, eliminating the
manifestly unreasonable qualifier but adding: “however, the partnership
agreement may not be amended to expand or add any specific types or

149. Id. at 892–94.
150. Id. at 893.
151. Id.
152. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3) (1997).
153. Id.
154. Clay B. Wortham, Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Anomalies of a Simplified,
Modernized Partnership Law, 92 KY. L.J. 1083, 1083 n.4 (2004) (citing ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET
AL., THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 1, at 531–32 (2003)).
155. Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
877, 904 (1997).
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categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty without the
156
consent of all partners after full disclosure of all material facts.”

Other states have resisted full implementation of the intended RUPA
changes. For instance, by omitting “only” from Section 404(a), California
legislators suggested that RUPA’s listing of fiduciary duties is not exclusive.157
Other states modify individual elements of RUPA’s listing. Florida, for
example, has enacted a non-exclusive version of the duty of loyalty provision
that permits courts to recognize unenumerated elements of that duty.158 Still
others further limit parties’ ability to contract out of fiduciary duties:
“California, Idaho, and Washington move in the other direction by making the
‘manifestly unreasonable’ qualifier apply to both categorical exclusions and
authorizations or ratifications of violations. Oregon substitutes a different test,
in this case an unconscionability test, for the manifestly unreasonable test
under RUPA.”159 Even where RUPA has been enacted as proposed, courts
sometimes resist its implications.160 Indeed, RUPA case law sometimes
appears to derive more from Meinhard than from RUPA’s contractarian roots.
In Enea v. Superior Court,161 for example, the trial court found that
defendant partners had not breached their fiduciary duties when they rented an
apartment to themselves at a below-market rate, thus leaving plaintiff partners
with a lesser than expected financial return. In its decision, the trial court
invoked RUPA Section 404(e): “A partner does not violate a duty or
obligation . . . merely because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s own
interest.”162
The appellate court, reversing, invoked instead the classic language of
fiduciary duty by noting that a “[p]artnership is a fiduciary relationship, and
partners may not take advantages for themselves at the expense of the
partnership.”163 The purpose of Section 404(e), it held, “is to excuse partners
from accounting for incidental benefits obtained in the course of partnership

156. Allan W. Vestal, “. . . Drawing Near the Fastness?”—The Failed United States
Experiment in Unincorporated Business Entity Reform, 26 J. CORP. L. 1019, 1027 (2001)
(citations omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1028.
159. Id. (footnote omitted).
160. See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 131, at 456 (exploring how Texas courts have resisted
implementing RUPA).
161. 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
162. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(e) (1997).
163. Enea, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 517 (quoting Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 835
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003)).
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activities without detriment to the partnership.”164 The adoption of RUPA, the
court concluded, was not intended to effect substantial change in this regard.165
Nevertheless, for the most part RUPA is the law in a majority of states and
is enforced as such. In a majority of states, therefore, our hypothetical lawyer
would apparently be permitted to purchase Whiteacre behind his partnership’s
back, notwithstanding the fact that the partnership was developing the
adjoining Blackacre, so long as our lawyer was prescient enough to insert
appropriate language into the partnership agreement limiting his duty of
loyalty as a partner and provided further that RUPA was the only applicable
law.
Perhaps surprisingly, the same would be true even if the partnership were a
limited partnership and our lawyer the managing general partner. Two
uniform acts have generally been adopted to govern limited partnerships in the
United States: the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA),166
issued in 1976, which remains the law in a majority of jurisdictions,167 and the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA),168 issued in 2001. Like UPA,
RULPA does not specify the fiduciary duties of a general partner, but states
that in order “to determine the fiduciary duties owed by the general partners in
a limited partnership, reference must be made to UPA or, in those jurisdictions
that have adopted RUPA, to RUPA.”169 RULPA Section 403(b) states that a
general partner in a limited partnership is subject to the same restrictions as a
partner in a partnership without limited partners, no more, no less.170
Similarly:
ULPA tracks the fiduciary duty language of RUPA section 404 and generally
provides that general partners owe the limited partnership and the other
partners circumscribed fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, and that they are

164. Id. at 518.
165. Id.
166. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT §§ 101–1106 (1976) (amended 1985).
167. Mitchell A. Stephens, Comment, A Trap for the Rational: Simultaneous Removal and
Appointment of a General Partner Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 521, 524–26.
168. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT §§ 101–1207 (2001).
169. Kenneth M. Jacobson, Fiduciary Duty Considerations in Choosing Between Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 5 (2001).
170. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 403(b) (1976) (amended 1985). Some have asserted
to the contrary that “[s]ince general partners in a limited partnership typically have the exclusive
power and authority to control and manage the partnership, they owe the limited partners an even
greater fiduciary duty than is imposed on general partners in the typical general partnership.” J.
WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL
AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 22:7 (2004).
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bound in the exercise of their duties to a non-fiduciary “obligation of good
171
faith and fair dealing.”

In ULPA states, therefore, and perhaps in RULPA states that have also adopted
RUPA, our lawyer might be able to contract out at least part of his duty of
loyalty in advance.
He would almost certainly be able to do so in Delaware. Delaware’s
Code172 expressly provides that a general partner’s fiduciary duties to a limited
partnership “may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the
partnership agreement.”173 Delaware has apparently adopted the ultimate
contractarian position that limited partnerships “should be interpreted ‘to give
the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the
enforceability of . . . agreements.’”174 Thus, in Sonet v. Timber Co.175
plaintiffs argued that defendants breached common law fiduciary duties by
partaking in a self-dealing transaction.176 The court rejected their claim,
holding that:
[U]nder Delaware limited partnership law a claim of breach of fiduciary duty
must first be analyzed in terms of the operative governing instrument—the
partnership agreement—and only where that document is silent or ambiguous,
or where principles of equity are implicated, will a Court begin to look for
guidance from the statutory default rules, traditional notions of fiduciary
177
duties, or other extrinsic evidence.

Since the limited partnership agreement was clear, the court concluded it
governed.178
C. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
The client-lawyer relationship is clearly an agency relationship. The
Introductory Note to Chapter 2, entitled “The Client-Lawyer Relationship,” of
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, states in part as
follows:
The subject of this Chapter is, from one point of view, derived from the law of
agency. It concerns a voluntary arrangement in which an agent, a lawyer,
agrees to work for the benefit of a principal, a client. A lawyer is an agent, to

171. J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The Want of a Theory, Again, 37 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 719, 722 (2004).
172. DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 101–5406 (2005).
173. Id. § 17–1101(d).
174. Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of Good Faith for
Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 126 (2005) (alteration in original).
175. 722 A.2d 319 (Del. Ch. 1998).
176. Id. at 321 n.2.
177. Id. at 324.
178. Id.
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whom clients entrust matters, property, and information, which may be of great
importance and sensitivity, and whose work is usually not subject to detailed
179
client supervision because of its complexity.

But the client-lawyer relationship is not an ordinary agency relationship. The
Introductory Note continues:
Because those characteristics of the client-lawyer relationship make clients
vulnerable to harm, and because of the importance to the legal system of
faithful representation, the law stated in this Chapter provides a number of
180
safeguards for clients beyond those generally provided to principals.

In other words, agency law as applied to lawyers is supposed to be more
protective of clients than generally applicable agency law, not less. Only one
exception is identified in the Introductory Note: “The law . . . limits client
authority for the protection of third persons dealing with the lawyer and for the
This exception, however, is
convenience of the judicial system.”181
inapplicable to our hypothetical.
The question, therefore, is starkly posed. A lawyer is clearly an agent and
fiduciary. As we have seen, however, Model Rules 1.8(a) and 1.8(b) convert
fiduciary law’s affirmative duty of loyalty into a series of limited prohibitions.
The first part of Rule 1.8(a) targets “overreaching” by lawyers in their business
dealings with clients;182 the second limits acquisitions “adverse to a client.”183
Rule 1.8(b), however, targets the use of client-confidential information “to the
disadvantage of the client.”184 In other words, Model Rules 1.8(a) and 1.8(b)
provide that lawyers should not hurt their clients. Apparently, we need
detailed rules to tell us this. In this part of the Model Rules, however,
affirmative aspects of a broad duty of loyalty—“I will to my client be true and
faithful”—are missing.
The Restatement (Third) of Agency could hardly offer a more complete
contrast. An agent has an affirmative fiduciary duty “to act loyally for the
principal’s benefit. . . .”185 The corporate opportunity doctrine, a part of this
duty, applies to all agents, not just officers and directors.186 Even if the
corporate opportunity doctrine were for some reason not to apply, an agent has
an affirmative duty to give his principal any information his principal would

179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 2, introductory note
(2000).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 1 (2008).
183. Id. R. 1.8(a).
184. Id. R. 1.8(b).
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
186. See id. § 8.02 cmt. d (“[A]ll agents . . . have a fiduciary duty to the principal not to take
personal advantage of an opportunity and not to give the opportunity to a third person . . . .”).
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wish to have.187 And breaches of these duties are broadly enforceable,
regardless of whether the principal can show actual harm.188 Real estate agents
are subject to these rules, as are corporate officers and directors, partners in
UPA states, and to some extent partners in RUPA states who have not
contracted out of their obligations.
But are lawyers subject to these same broad duties and remedies? Or can
they safely take refuge behind the Model Rules? The answer provided by the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is mixed.
1.

Section 60(2): Use of Confidential Information for Pecuniary Gain

Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers Section 60(2)
provides that “a lawyer who uses confidential information of a client for the
lawyer’s pecuniary gain other than in the practice of law must account to the
client for any profits made.”189 In our hypothetical, if the lawyer uses the
information he has been given regarding his client’s shopping center plans to
identify and purchase an adjacent undervalued property, he must disgorge any
resulting profits to the client. End of story.
Here, the Model Rules are of no avail. At least at first blush, the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers sounds a lot like the
Restatement (Third) of Agency. In practice, it would be very difficult for a
lawyer who wants to buy Whiteacre to rationalize Section 60(2) away. The
comments which accompany that section are equally clear. Comment (j), in
particular, states:
Subsection (2) prohibits a lawyer from using or disclosing confidential client
information for the lawyer’s personal enrichment, regardless of lack of risk of
prejudice to the affected client. The duty is removed by client consent. The
sole remedy of the client for breach of the duty is restitutionary relief in the
form of disgorgement of profit. The lawyer codes differ over whether such
self-enriching use or disclosure constitutes a disciplinary violation in the
absence of prejudice to the client.
The strict confidentiality duty of the Subsection is warranted for
prophylactic purposes. A lawyer who acquires confidential client information
as the result of a representation should not be tempted by expectation of profit
to risk a possibly incorrect assessment of future harm to a client. There is no
important social interest in permitting lawyers to make unconsented use or

187. See id. § 8.01 cmt. b (“An agent also has a duty to use reasonable efforts to provide
material information to the principal.”).
188. Id. cmt. d.1.
189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(2) (2000). Section 59
defines confidential client information as “information relating to representation of a client, other
than information that is generally known.” Id. § 59.
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revelation of confidential information for self-enrichment in personal
190
transactions.

Before we congratulate ourselves on the apparent willingness of the legal
profession to subject itself to the same rules it has imposed on everyone else,
however, we may want to consider three aspects of Section 60(2) that differ
significantly from the Restatement (Third) of Agency’s approach.
First, we must consider Section 60(2) in the context of its theoretical
justification. Does Section 60(2) implement a concept of fiduciary duty? As
we have noted, disgorgement of profits is one of the remedies that would be
available in like circumstances for breach of any other agent’s fiduciary duties
to her principal. In addition, an action for accounting is equitable and might
therefore be seen to reflect fiduciary duty’s equitable origins. An order for
disgorgement of profits is similarly equitable, as is the concept providing relief
to a party without first requiring that party to demonstrate actual harm. On the
other hand, Comment (j) justifies Section 60(2) purely on prophylactic
grounds, not by reference to fiduciary obligations. The worry is rather of “a
possibly incorrect assessment of future harm to a client.”191 Like the Model
Rules, Section 60(2) seems more concerned that lawyers not harm their clients
than about any affirmative duty of loyalty.
Second, remedy under Section 60(2) must be considered. Comment (j) is
explicit: “The sole remedy of the client for breach of the duty is restitutionary
relief in the form of disgorgement of profit.”192 Recall that the Restatement
(Third) of Agency was more generous in its remedies for this kind of breach:
disgorgement, forfeiture of fees, constructive trust, and consequential damages.
In the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, fee forfeiture is
addressed in Section 37, which provides:
A lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may be
required to forfeit some or all of the lawyer’s compensation for the matter.
Considerations relevant to the question of forfeiture include the gravity and
timing of the violation, its willfulness, its effect on the value of the lawyer’s
work for the client, any other threatened or actual harm to the client, and the
193
adequacy of other remedies.

The Comments to Section 37, however, never explicitly refer to fiduciary duty.
Comment (c) states that “[t]he source of the duty can be civil or criminal law,
including, for example, the requirements of an applicable lawyer code or the
law of malpractice.”194 In addition, it is not at all clear that the violation in our
hypothetical is “clear and serious.” Comment (d) elaborates: “A violation is
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. § 60 cmt. j (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 37 (emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 cmt. c (2000).
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clear if a reasonable lawyer, knowing the relevant facts and law reasonably
accessible to the lawyer, would have known that the conduct was wrongful.”195
Since the Model Rules do not prohibit the purchase, our hypothetical lawyer
might well argue that he was not on appropriate notice of any such prohibition.
Comment (b) further states: “The remedy of fee forfeiture presupposes that a
lawyer’s clear and serious violation . . . destroys or severely impairs the clientlawyer relationship and thereby the justification of the lawyer’s claim to
Our hypothetical lawyer, let us assume, has done
compensation.”196
everything his client has asked of him, and done it well. He may well argue
that he deserves to be paid. According to the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, he apparently should be.
Finally, the scope of Section 60(2) must be examined. Section 60(2) does
not apply at all unless confidential information is involved.197 Assume that our
hypothetical lawyer is driving to work one morning. His route takes him past
the shopping center construction site, where a large sign announces the client’s
plans. Next to the construction site is Whiteacre, in front of which is a sign
publicly announcing its availability for purchase. Assume, therefore, that none
of the information relevant to a possible purchase of Whiteacre by the lawyer
is confidential. Now is the lawyer precluded from purchasing Whiteacre
without first consulting his client?
Note that if our hypothetical lawyer were instead (or in addition) the
client’s real estate agent, officer, director, or partner, he would probably still be
so precluded. Recall that Section 5.05(b) of the Principles of Corporate
Governance defines “corporate opportunity” to include: “Any opportunity to
engage in a business activity of which [the agent] becomes aware and knows is
closely related to a business in which the [principal] is engaged or expects to
engage.”198 Here, Whiteacre adjoins Blackacre. The potential for profit in the
one is directly attributable to the client’s development of the other. If none of
the relevant information is confidential, however, Section 60(2) is inapplicable.
2.

Section 16(3): Honest Dealing

The closest the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers comes
to addressing this modified hypothetical is the portion of Section 16(3) that
provides that: “[A] lawyer must, in matters within the scope of the
representation . . . deal honestly with the client . . . .”199 Arguably, honest
dealing requires prior disclosure of the lawyer’s intention to buy Whiteacre.

195. Id. cmt. d.
196. Id. cmt. b.
197. See id. § 60 cmt. a (“This section states the principal duties of a lawyer with respect to
confidential client information.”).
198. A.L.I., supra note 87, § 5.05(b)(2).
199. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(3) (2000).
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The fact that the client would likely feel betrayed if the lawyer were to
purchase Whiteacre behind her back is itself evidence that failure to make prior
disclosure may not be honest dealing. Once the lawyer has told the client of
his intention, of course, the client may object. If she does, the purchase
probably becomes adverse, and therefore prohibited.200
We are relieved to discover that Comment (b) justifies the honest dealing
and other requirements of Section 16 explicitly by reference to the lawyer’s
fiduciary obligations: “A lawyer is a fiduciary, that is, a person to whom
another person’s affairs are entrusted in circumstances that often make it
difficult or undesirable for that other person to supervise closely the
performance of the fiduciary. Assurances of the lawyer’s competence,
diligence, and loyalty are therefore vital.”201 Comment (e), in turn, treats the
obligation of honest dealing as part of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and requires
affirmative disclosures in at least some circumstances: “A lawyer must be
honest with a client. . . . A lawyer . . . must make disclosures to a client
necessary to avoid misleading the client.”202
The problem is that under the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers, the remedy of disgorgement is limited to Section 60(2). Since
Section 60(2) is, by its terms, inapplicable to our modified hypothetical,
disgorgement is apparently not available. Section 37 fee forfeiture may be, but
only if the violation is “clear and serious.”203 Here, it arguably is not.
Notwithstanding Section 16(3)’s bow in the direction of fiduciary duty, the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers then retreats from the
ordinary consequences of breaches of such duties to non-lawyers. Section 49
provides: “In addition to the other possible bases of civil liability . . . , a lawyer
is civilly liable to a client if the lawyer breaches a fiduciary duty to the client
set forth in § 16(3) and if that failure is a legal cause of injury within the
meaning of § 53 . . . .”204 But Section 53 then substantially limits Section 49:
“A lawyer is liable under § 48 or § 49 only if the lawyer’s . . . breach of
fiduciary duty was a legal cause of injury, as determined under generally
applicable principles of causation and damages.”205 What the Restatement
giveth, the Restatement taketh away. Yes, lawyers are fiduciaries. But no,
lawyers are not liable for breaches of fiduciary duty as other agents would be

200. Like Model Rule § 18(a), Section 125 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers provides that unless a client consents, “[A] lawyer may not represent a client if there is a
substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client would be materially and adversely
affected by the lawyer’s financial or other personal interests.” Id. § 125.
201. Id. § 16 cmt. b.
202. Id. cmt. e.
203. Id. § 37 cmt. d.
204. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (2000).
205. Id. § 53 (emphasis added).
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unless the client suffers actual harm, except to the extent of the prophylactic
rule of Section 60(2) or the fee disgorgement provisions of Section 37.
We are left with consequential damages, a far less effective remedy in this
context. What is the dollar amount by which the client has been injured by her
lawyer’s purchase of Whiteacre? In most cases, the client will probably not be
able to prove a dollar amount. In most cases, therefore, she will have no
remedy.
Why? This aspect of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers may reflect an ongoing difficulty courts have had in distinguishing
breaches of fiduciary duty from negligence actions for legal malpractice, to
which I now turn.206
3.

Breaches of Fiduciary Duty v. Legal Malpractice

It is clear that a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is separate and
distinct from a cause of action for professional negligence. The relationship
between the two, however, appears to have puzzled some courts and
commentators.207 This may be due to the dominance of the Model Rules. It
may be due to the fact that courts and commentators rarely refer back to the
basic law of agency, focusing instead on tort law, the Model rules, or the

206. See Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View from the
Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 719–42 (1998) (exploring history of Restatement’s treatment
of actions for breach of fiduciary duty).
207. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48, 49 (2000); see
also Ray Ryden Anderson & Walter Steele Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on
the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235 (1994) (discussing how the courts confuse
the breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice actions); Kevin William Gibson, Breach of
Fiduciary Duty, DEL. LAWYER, Winter 2004–2005, at 29 (“[C]ourts sometimes fail to distinguish
among the various types of legal malpractice actions, and alternatively, interpret a breach of
fiduciary duty action as a malpractice action based upon claims of professional negligence.”);
John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101,
112–18 (1995) (explaining how courts and commentators have said little concerning the
connection between a lawyer’s liability for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty);
Christopher Brian Little, Breach of Fiduciary Duty in the Lawyer’s Professional Liability Claim,
COLO. LAWYER, Nov. 2000, at 101 (“Courts have routinely found that the breach of fiduciary
duty claim is nothing more than a reiteration of the negligence or standard of care claim, and they
consider the two claims as duplicative.”); Stephen E. McConnico et al., Unresolved Problems in
Texas Legal Malpractice Law, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 989, 1025 (2005) (“One of the more difficult
fracturing issues has been the question of where to draw the line between traditional legal
malpractice (professional negligence) claims and breach of fiduciary duty claims.”); Daniel J.
Pope & Suzanne Lee, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Punitive Damages, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 257,
259 (1999) (explaining how “[s]ome courts have determined that a client’s fiduciary duty claim
against an attorney is” equated with legal malpractice); Melissa A. Thomas, When Is an
Attorney’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty in Missouri Not Legal Malpractice?, 63 MO. L. REV. 595,
595 (1998) (“[C]onfusion [exists] about when attorney misconduct constitutes legal malpractice
and when it does not.”).
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Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. Or it may be due to the
fact that the issue is most commonly presented and analyzed in the litigation
malpractice context, where profit opportunities like those presented in my
hypothetical are uncommon.
As a cause of action, “[a] breach of fiduciary duty occurs when an attorney
benefits improperly from the attorney-client relationship by, among other
things, subordinating his client’s interests to his own, retaining the client’s
funds, using the client’s confidences improperly, taking advantage of the
client’s trust, engaging in self-dealing, or making misrepresentations.”208 A
legal malpractice claim, on the other hand, focuses on the quality of the
representation provided by the attorney to her client, as it requires
demonstrating negligence—a showing that the attorney provided legal services
at unacceptable levels of competence or diligence.209
Notwithstanding these differences, courts and practitioners sometimes
conflate the two.210 In fact, it appears to be common practice to include the
terms “negligence and breach of fiduciary duty” in legal-malpractice
complaints as near-synonyms, the one following the other without apparent
reflection.211 As a result, decisions which have treated fiduciary breach as a
separate cause of action sometimes generate shockwaves among attorneys
within the relevant jurisdictions.212 Of greatest concern to attorneys is the fact
that, in many situations, a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty does not
require a showing of actual damage to the client.213
While the notion of recovery without damages may seem exotic to
personal injury lawyers, it is standard in the law of agency, as we have seen.
Recall Comment (d)(1) to Section 8.01 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency:
The law of restitution and unjust enrichment also creates a basis for an agent’s
liability to a principal when the agent breaches a fiduciary duty, even though
the principal cannot establish that the agent’s breach caused loss to the
principal. If through the breach the agent has realized a material benefit, the
agent has a duty to account to the principal for the benefit, its value, or its
214
proceeds.

208. McConnico et al., supra note 207, at 1025–26 (quoting Kimleco Petroleum, Inc. v.
Morrison & Shelton, 91 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. App. 2002)).
209. Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1142 (1999).
210. Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 689, 692 (2006).
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., McConnico et al., supra note 207, at 1029 (describing the fact that the fee
forfeiture remedy was available for violations of fiduciary duty without a showing of actual
damage to the client in Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999)).
213. See id.
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt d.1 (2006) (emphasis added).
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Recall also Comment (d)(2) with regard to fee forfeiture:
Forfeiture may be the only available remedy when it is difficult to prove that
harm to a principal resulted from the agent’s breach or when the agent realizes
no profit through the breach. In many cases, forfeiture enables a remedy to be
determined at a much lower cost to litigants. Forfeiture may also have a
valuable deterrent effect because its availability signals agents that some
215
adverse consequence will follow a breach of fiduciary duty.

There is no obvious reason that real estate agents, directors, officers, and
partners should be subject to these principles, but attorneys exempt. And at
least some courts have so held.
In Burrow v. Arce,216 for example, clients alleged that their attorneys
placed their own interests in obtaining fees, computed as a percentage of the
total settlement amount, over their clients’ interests in individual claims. The
Texas Supreme Court concluded that client-plaintiffs’ complaints were wellfounded, and therefore summary judgment was not appropriate for the issue of
whether the attorney-defendants had indeed breached their fiduciary duties.217
The court found client-plaintiffs did not have to prove the amount of any actual
damages to obtain forfeiture of attorney’s fees, however, and it remanded for
determination of a disgorgement of the fees that attorney-defendants had
negotiated for themselves as part of the settlement.218
Nevertheless, Burrow and similar cases have caused some to argue for
further restrictions on remedies for lawyers’ breaches of fiduciary duty.
Professor Duncan, for example, has argued that “[a] lawyer who has breached
a fiduciary obligation should be liable to the aggrieved client in the absence of
harm only if such breach was a criminal offense or was the result of a scheme
to defraud the client.”219 Without such a limitation, fiduciary breach will
eventually supplant legal malpractice as the preferred cause of action because
of the relative ease of proving fiduciary breach.220 She would apparently reject
both Section 60(2) and Section 37 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, themselves significantly less protective of principals than
the Restatement (Third) of Agency applicable to other professions.
Collapsing fiduciary duty into legal malpractice completely can produce
bizarre results. In Vallinoto v. DiSandro,221 for example, plaintiff retained
defendant attorney to represent her in divorce proceedings. Plaintiff admitted
that defendant supplied excellent legal representation. She also asserted,

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. cmt. d.2 (emphasis added).
997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999).
Id. at 237.
Id.
Duncan, supra note 209, at 1172.
See id. at 1158–59.
688 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1997).
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however, that defendant compelled her to perform sexual acts with him by
threatening to discontinue representation, which he said would result in
deportation and loss of her child.222 Plaintiff later sued defendant, asserting
legal malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery, deceit
and negligence.223 Although the jury found for plaintiff, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island found no legally cognizable harm, since defendant’s legal work
was concededly excellent.224 Without evidence of damages, plaintiff could not
prevail on a negligence-based legal malpractice claim; therefore the court
reversed the judgment below.225 Additionally, the court agreed that plaintiff’s
evidence regarding defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty was correctly
excluded from trial because plaintiff failed to properly plead a fiduciary duty
claim.226 Was defendant’s conduct a “criminal offense” or “a scheme to
defraud the client” within Professor Duncan’s meaning? Probably not. Was it
a “clear and serious” violation of defendant’s fiduciary duties within the
meaning Section 37’s fee forfeiture rule? Probably so. Unfortunately, the
plaintiff in Vallinoto did not properly plead breach of fiduciary duty; therefore,
the court refused to address the possible breach.227 And without actual
negligence, there could be no injury from negligence.228
Given some courts’ and commentators’ difficulties with lawsuits for
breach of fiduciary duty brought against lawyers, the apparent failure of the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers to impose all of the
ordinary consequences of the black-letter law of agency on lawyers is perhaps
understandable, although not excusable. Some better and more internally
coherent resolution is needed.
III. A PROPOSED RECONCILIATION
Here, I propose to undertake two final tasks: first, to reconcile the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers with the Model Rules; and
second, to offer one possible approach to reconciling the law governing
lawyers with the black-letter law of agency applicable to everyone else—an
approach that takes into account the concerns of the legal malpractice defense
bar while at the same time acknowledging the vital role that an independent
duty of loyalty should continue to play in the legal profession.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 833.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 836–37.
Vallinoto, 688 A.2d at 836–37.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 836.
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The Model Rules and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers

Although the matter is not free from doubt, in theory the Model Rules
would allow our hypothetical lawyer to purchase Whiteacre behind his client’s
back. As a practical matter, they would almost certainly do so. The
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, by contrast, would almost
certainly prohibit the purchase without prior consultation and consent if
confidential information was involved, and it would require our hypothetical
lawyer to disgorge to his client his profits, if any, from that purchase.
Why the difference? The answer is that the purposes of the two are
different. As Comment (b) to Restatement Section 1 states: “Lawyer codes
[the Restatement’s term for codes based on the Model Rules] are promulgated
and applied primarily for the purpose of establishing mandatory standards for
the assessment of a lawyer’s conduct in the course of a professional-discipline
proceeding.”229 The Restatement itself, by contrast, purports to summarize all
generally applicable law governing lawyers, not just the portion that governs
disciplinary proceedings. Comment (b) continues:
The lawyer codes and much general law remain complementary. The lawyer
codes draw much of their moral force and, in many particulars, the detailed
description of their rules from preexisting legal requirements and concepts
found in the law of torts, contracts, agency, trusts, property, remedies,
procedure, evidence, and crimes. Thus, lawyer codes particularize some
general legal rules in the particular occupational situation of lawyers but are
not exhaustive of those rules. . . .The lawyer codes . . . do not preclude
230
application of remedies prescribed by other law.

Most notably, it is clear that the authors of the Restatement view a
lawyer’s fiduciary role as central, as a matter of law, to defining his duties to
his client.231 By contrast, the authors of the Model Rules do not view
references to that fiduciary role as the best way to structure disciplinary
rules;232 precision, after all, is not one of fiduciary law’s obvious attributes.
The Restatement and the Model Rules, therefore, are not inherently
inconsistent.
But if this is so, analysis of problems in legal ethics cannot begin and end
with the professional rules. The Restatement captures elements of the law
governing lawyers—enforceable elements of that law—that the Model Rules
do not.233 Even if and to the extent that parts of a lawyer’s duty of loyalty are

229. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b (2000).
230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See supra Part II.A.
233. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 cmt. d
(2000) (invoking the reasonable person standard to prove a clear violation of duty to a client) with
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not enforceable in a particular jurisdiction, a good lawyer will still consider
herself duty-bound.
B.

The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers and the
Restatement (Third) of Agency

The harder problem is how to bring the law governing lawyers back into
compliance with the black-letter law of agency applicable to everyone else.
The premise that lawyers are and should be subject to less stringent, less
enforceable rules of fiduciary responsibility than everyone else is simply
unacceptable.
The client-lawyer relationship is not like a partnership—a simple economic
relationship in which each is presumed capable of protecting his interests vis-àvis the other, at least in UPA jurisdictions.234 Ordinary lawyers and ordinary
clients are inherently unequal in negotiating the terms of their relationship. As
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes: “A license
to practice law confers great power on lawyers to do good or wrong. Lawyers
practice an occupation that is complex and often, particularly to nonlawyers,
mysterious. Clients and others are vulnerable to wrongdoing by corrupt
lawyers.”235 It is for this reason, the Restatement explains, that we limit the
practice of law to individuals of good character.236 It is also for this reason that
we impose on lawyers, as we do on others in positions of trust, the amorphous,
not-fully-codifiable standards of fiduciary law.
Even if this were not true, it would be profoundly inefficient to require
clients to negotiate retainer agreements to protect the reasonable expectations
that fiduciary rules protect. As Comment (b) to Restatement (Third) of
Agency Section 8.01 explains: “The fiduciary principle supplements
manifestations that a principal makes to an agent, making it unnecessary for
the principal to graft explicit qualifications and prohibitions onto the
principal’s statements of authorization to the agent.”237 Ordinary client
expectations should be built into fiduciary law to avoid the transaction costs
required to implement them by contract. In defining the scope of the duty of
loyalty, it may therefore be useful to ask if the reasonable client in like
circumstances would feel even mildly betrayed by a particular action. Would
the client in our hypothetical likely feel betrayed if her lawyer were to

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2008) (invoking a vague standard that “does not
prohibit uses [of information] that do not disadvantage the client”).
234. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(e) (1997) (“A partner does not violate a duty or
obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement merely because the partner’s
conduct furthers the partner’s own interest.” (alteration in original)).
235. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 2 cmt. d (2000).
236. Id.
237. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006).
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purchase Whiteacre behind her back? Probably. Would a reasonable plaintiff
in Burrow likely feel betrayed if his lawyers browbeat him into acquiescing in
a settlement that gave them their full contingency fee with relatively little work
while largely ignoring his interests? Probably. Would the ordinary client in a
divorce case feel betrayed if her lawyer threatened deportation and loss of her
child if she refused to sleep with him? Probably. Should we require each of
these clients to protect against such betrayals by negotiating appropriate
contractual limitations on their lawyers’ behaviors in advance? Of course not.
One should not have to hire a lawyer to hire a lawyer.
Finally, for the legal profession to impose on itself duties less rigorous,
enforceable by remedies less onerous, than those it imposes on others in like
positions of trust would itself be a betrayal. If we, as lawyers, desire honor, we
must practice honor. If we, as lawyers, desire loyalty, we must practice
loyalty.
I do not mean to suggest that the concerns of practitioners, courts, and
commentators about the increasing use of fiduciary duty to circumvent the
ordinary rules of negligence are unfounded. There is, however, a relatively
simple solution. As the Restatement already acknowledges, a lawyer’s
fiduciary obligations can be divided into two parts: (1) duties of competence
and diligence238 and (2) duties of loyalty.239 As we have seen, RUPA already
draws this distinction formally,240 limiting liability for the first in ways that it
does not limit liability for the second.241 The law governing lawyers should
draw the same distinction by limiting an attorney’s liability for incompetence
or lack of diligence to situations in which his conduct fails to meet ordinary
negligence standards and limiting recovery, in most situations, to
compensatory damages. The law governing lawyers should not, however, so
limit causes of action for breaches of duties of loyalty. For this purpose, by
“loyalty” I mean simply putting the client’s interests first—to “love all which
he loves and shun all which he shuns.” Lawyers should be subject to the same
duty of loyalty imposed on others in positions of trust and to the same
remedies for breach.

238. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(2) (2000) (“[A]
lawyer must . . . act with reasonable competence and diligence.”).
239. See id. § 16(3) (“[A] lawyer must . . . comply with obligations concerning the client’s
confidences and property, avoid impermissible conflicting interests, deal honestly with the client,
and not employ advantages arising from the client-lawyer relationship in a manner adverse to the
client.”).
240. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(a) (1997) (“The only fiduciary duties a partner
owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth
in subsections (b) and (c).”).
241. See id. § 404(c) (“A partner’s duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the
conduct and winding up of the partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in
grossly negligent or reckless conduct . . . .”).
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This distinction may already be reflected in the case law; it may simply not
yet have been recognized. Regardless, it is workable, would meet the
reasonable objections of those concerned about plaintiff overreaching, and
would allow lawyers legitimately to claim the same high moral regard now
accorded to real estate agents, business executives, and partners.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the lawyer’s role as fiduciary has been inappropriately
deemphasized in the consideration of legal ethical questions. This is now
reflected in the way many teach legal ethics. It is increasingly reflected in the
way courts analyze client-lawyer disputes. This is both unfortunate and
unnecessary. A lawyer’s fiduciary duties, particularly her duties of loyalty, are
easily reconciled with both her obligations under professional disciplinary
rules and her obligations in tort. Their reemphasis would protect legitimate
client expectations, enhance the ability of good lawyers to gain clients’ trust
and thereby serve clients more effectively, and bring our profession into better
repute. Lawyers are, first and foremost, fiduciaries.

